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This is an excellent book, full of careful
research lightly worn. It is highly readable,
provoking the intellectual and moral, as
well as historical, imagination. Soldiers as
well as doctors, specialist historians as well
as non-academic readers, will surely read it:
no mean accomplishment. It is neither
military history, nor medical history, nor
social history, but all of these. Ben
Shephard writes without prejudgement of
the great range of ways in which war
damages minds, and ways in which people
manage as well as fail to manage. That
medicine must serve many masters is not
news. But here we have a large-scale picture
of what this means, often under the most
emotive conditions, in the lives of
participants ofall kinds.
The book describes the presentation of
nervous and mental disorders in war, and
the medical response to them, under the
headings ofwhat at different times have
been called "shell-shock", combat fatigue
and post-traumatic stress disorder. The two
great world wars-their aftermaths and
domestic contexts as much as the actual
fighting-dominate the book. All the same,
the concluding chapters on the Vietnam
War, the GulfWar and even the Falklands
War significantly influence the book as a
whole. Indeed, the book can be read as a
profound reflection on the confusions, the
swing from confident assertion to
bewilderment, engendered by two decades
of contemporary argument about post-
traumatic stress disorder. The implication is
that only the historical record will enable
participants to see antagonistic positions in
perspective. The book finds a repeated cycle
of denial, exaggeration, understanding and
forgetfulness about war-damaged minds. In
part, this reflects the different interests at
work, in very emotionally charged
circumstances, from the senior officers
battling for morale and fighting strength,
the psychiatrists concerned for patients and
professional ambition, the public wanting
fighting but its sons kept whole, and
bureaucracies contemplating huge long-term
costs. The result, as this book clearly and
authoritatively shows, is a kaleidoscope of
shifting practice and opinion, conditions in
which strong and charismatic individuals
can and do make an impact, if only for a
time.
Shephard has drawn on a marvellous
variety of sources, especially from Britain
but also from the United States, with an eye
to what was happening elsewhere but
without comparable detail. It is this
patience and tenacity in conducting research
on such a range ofmaterial, from studies of
prisoners ofwar to domestic public opinion,
from front-line trenches or tanks to
innovations in group therapy, from
problems of recruitment to problems of
pensions, that makes the book stand out.
Just how much some parties have had an
interest in the story ofhuman collapse not
being told is especially pointed in a chapter
on the allied bombing campaign over
Germany. The half-familiar story of the
significance to British psychology of "shell-
shock" receives full treatment, and the story
reduces the role of psychoanalysis to its
proper proportions.
The book brings home the ordinariness of
suffering, weakness and collapse when
people face not just actual violence but its
prospect. It is rich in detail from multiple
perspectives: the scathing views of generals
on the corrupting influence ofmedicine; the
ambivalence of doctors working for and, in
some instances, against the military; the
soldiers themselves, expressing guilt for
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cowardliness as well as symptoms. But what
Shephard hints at but does not fully bring
out is the dilemma he faces along with his
subjects. On the one hand, he calls for
accurate knowledge of past experience and
for more facts. He thus implies that, with
the full facts, the real nature ofcombat or
post-traumatic stress disorders would
become clear. On the other hand, his
history repeatedly emphasizes the in-built
conflict of military and healing values, a
conflict in which, as he explains, "tough"
and "tender" schools of opinion constantly
reappear. Public opinion, maybe, wants it
both ways-a position currently addressed
by the fantasy of an air war in which only
the enemy suffers. During past wars,
doctors learned to serve military goals, and
they even sometimes acknowledged that
how men manage may have little to do with
what doctors, working specifically as
doctors, offer. In the most dramatic case,
psychiatrists reported a perception that
sending a man back to the front, and to
likely death, might be better for his
"health" than to invalid him out with his
symptoms, and loss of self-respect, into an
uncertain future. But in peacetime, other
values come back to haunt psychiatrists,
public opinion and soldiers themselves.
Thus, it may be, no amount of empirical
knowledge, medical or historical, will solve
for us the contradiction of seeking to be
humane in war.
Roger Smith,
Institute for the History of Science and
Technology of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, Moscow
Kenneth J Carpenter, Beriberi, white rice,
and vitamin B: a disease, a cause, and a cure,
Berkeley and London, University of
California Press, 2000, pp. xiv, 282, illus.,
£27.95, US$40.00 (hardback 0-520-22053).
The value of Carpenter's work lies in the
fact that it challenges the myth-making that
often characterizes the historiography
relating to the identification of the
cause-and the prevention-of beriberi.
Caused by a deficiency of thiamine (Vitamin
B), the basis of beriberi had been the
subject of much scientific speculation in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Indeed, many, including
Christiaan Eijkman (the Dutch physician
assigned to work with a team investigating
beriberi in Java in the late 1880s), often
wondered whether it was an infection
transmitted by a specific germ. A series of
experiments by Eijkman, carried out on
laboratory animals and selected human
subjects, ultimately proved that the
condition of beriberi was the result of
specific dietary patterns, rather than
infectious micro-organisms.
Strikingly, ultimate success in identifying
the cause ofberiberi, according to
Carpenter, is attributable to big doses of
luck. A change in the choice of laboratory
animals, which was forced by financial
difficulties, provided the first major
breakthrough. The shift from monkeys and
rabbits to chickens proved decisive, as fowl
tended to be more predisposed to showing
the effects of thiamine deficiency after being
kept on a diet of boiled white rice.
However, these investigative successes
proved extremely troublesome in a situation
where experiments were often difficult to
replicate, causing doubts amongst the
scientific community about their results.
Carpenter describes, for instance, how
Eijkman struggled to copy his successful
Javanese experiments with chickens in
Amsterdam. This, in fact, caused him to toy
with the infection theory of causation for a
while, before he finally decided to plump for
the dietary theory in 1912 on the back of
the results of new experiments (Eijkman
received the Nobel prize for his work in
1929).
In addition to providing a fine description
of Eijkman's research in Java and the
Netherlands, Carpenter's book also
describes a series of valuable experiments on
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